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Food with Integrity?: How Responsible
Corporate Officer Prosecutions Under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Deny
Fair Warning to Corporate Officers
∗

[W]hen it comes to food safety, we have to rely on the
companies that manufacture and distribute food to ensure
that the food we buy is safe. In fact, most consumers give
little thought to the safety of their food. I know I don’t and
I bet many of you don’t either. We simply don’t expect to
get sick from the food at our favorite restaurant, or from
peanut butter or the eggs or the cantaloupes or the countless
other products that we buy at the supermarket. That is why
food safety is a priority for the Justice Department. Our
role in protecting consumer safety is at its apex when
consumers can least protect themselves.1

From 2012 to 2015, Chipotle Mexican Grill (Chipotle) was
widely regarded as the most popular restaurant in America in the
fast, casual Mexican food category.2 Known for its fresh
ingredients and promotion of environmental justice, the fast
food restaurant chain rapidly became one of the most recognized

The author sincerely thanks Tiffany Murphy, Associate Professor of Law, University of
Arkansas School of Law, for her thoughtful guidance throughout the drafting of this
comment. The author also thanks Susan Schneider, William H. Enfield Professor of Law,
University of Arkansas School of Law, Madison Throneberry, family, and friends for
providing insight into the topic of this Comment, as well as constant encouragement and
moral support during the drafting process.
1. Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Remarks at the
Consumer Federation of America’s 39th Annual National Food Policy Conference (Apr. 6,
2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/principal-deputy-assistant-attorney-generalbenjamin-c-mizer-delivers-remarks-consumer [https://perma.cc/9UHW-Q8E3].
2. See Hadley Malcolm, This Restaurant Just Unseated Chipotle as the Most
Popular Mexican Chain, USA TODAY (June 11, 2016, 7:06 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2016/06/09/moes-southwest-grill-most-popularmexican-chain/85640598/ [https://perma.cc/5WRJ-RRW9].
∗
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and trusted food brands in America.3 However, in 2015,
Chipotle’s popularity plummeted nearly as quickly as its
meteoric rise began.4 Notably, the restaurant’s signature burrito
bowls and urban building designs had not changed,5 but the
public’s trust in the restaurant’s ability to provide “food with
integrity” was shaken after fifty-five customers became severely
ill.6 Twenty-one of these fifty-five customers had to be
hospitalized during the 2015 outbreak that spanned eleven
states.7 Unfortunately, this was not Chipotle’s first major
foodborne illness outbreak.8 In fact, this E. coli outbreak
occurred just months after hundreds of Chipotle patrons reported
severe illness from outbreaks of Salmonella and norovirus in the
restaurant’s food product.9
Food companies and food law commentators are awaiting
to see how the United States Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) holds Chipotle, a company with over 1,800 restaurant
locations and a market cap of $13.1 billion, accountable for their
food safety procedures that caused repeated outbreaks and
severe illness for hundreds of Americans.10 Recent FDA action

3. See Brad Tuttle, How Chipotle Went from Industry Darling to Restaurant to
Avoid, TIME (Dec. 8, 2015), http://time.com/money/4140531/chipotle-e-coli-outbreakbrand-reputation/ [https://perma.cc/VW4H-XG92].
4. Id.
5. See Malcolm, supra note 2.
6. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Investigates Multistate Outbreak of E. Coli
026 Infections Linked to Chipotle Mexican Grill Restaurants (Feb. 1, 2016),
http://www.fda.gov/Food/RecallsOutbreaksEmergencies/Outbreaks/ucm470410.htm#updat
e [https://perma.cc/WJ9C-9LN2].
7. Id.
8. See Coral Beach, UPDATED: CDC Declares Chipotle E. Coli Outbreaks Over;
Cause
Unknown,
FOOD
SAFETY
NEWS
(Feb.
1,
2016),
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2016/02/cdc-declares-chipotle-e-coli-outbreaks-overcause-unknown/#.WA-V0E0zV9A [https://perma.cc/KQZ7-AQEY].
9. Id.
10. See The World’s Most Innovative Companies, FORBES (May 2016),
http://www.forbes.com/companies/chipotle-mexican-grill/ [https://perma.cc/J67R-PQ6D];
Sarah N. Lynch, Chipotle Outbreak Eyed by Justice Dept. Consumer Unit, REUTERS (Jan.
8, 2016, 10:00 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-chipotle-mexican-u-s-justice-deptidUSKBN0UM2GS20160109 [https://perma.cc/L5PM-TRXE]; Hayley Peterson, The
Ridiculous Reason McDonald’s Sold Chipotle and Missed Out on Billions of Dollars, BUS.
INSIDER (May 22, 2015, 3:11 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-ridiculous-reasonmcdonalds-sold-chipotle-2015-5 [https://perma.cc/6W4E-SJR8].
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indicates that the agency may start by establishing a criminal
record for Chipotle’s corporate officers.11
The high-profile Chipotle foodborne illness outbreaks
emerge at a critical time for federal food safety enforcement.
Under the Obama administration, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) has declared the enforcement of food safety standards as
a high priority.12 Furthermore, the FDA and the DOJ have
elected to enforce food safety standards by imposing criminal
liability created under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA) on food companies “responsible corporate
officers.”13 The FDA believes the rarely-used doctrine will hold
companies more accountable for their harmful food safety
procedures because corporate officers have incentive to
proactively avert the implementation and continuance of such
procedures.14 Further, proponents of the doctrine note that
corporate officers have control to implement policies and
procedures that will prevent FDCA violations.15
Alarmingly, as an increasing number of food company
corporate officers have been investigated and prosecuted under
the responsible corporate officer doctrine,16 it has become
difficult to identify the precise legal standards the DOJ uses to
decide whether prosecution is appropriate.17 Although some
corporate officers are charged and prosecuted for their
company’s FDCA violations, almost as many officers in
11. See Lynch, supra note 10.
12. See Mizer, supra note 1.
13. Roscoe C. Howard Jr. & Leasa Woods Anderson, Trends in Responsible
Corporate Officer Doctrine Under FDCA, LAW360 (Dec. 14, 2015, 1:11 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/737403/trends-in-responsible-corporate-officer-doctrineunder-fdca [https://perma.cc/HV6E-RXSL].
14. Dan Flynn, Reprieve from Criminal Prosecutions May Be Ending for Food
Execs,
FOOD
SAFETY
NEWS
(May
4,
2012),
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/05/criminal-prosecution-drought-may-be-endingfor-food-execs/#.WNQM1s8rKUI [https://perma.cc/F3QV-N75T].
Dr. Margaret
Hamburg, the top-ranking official at the FDA, suggested that the FDA and the DOJ would
establish renewed prioritization of food safety enforcement through “the appropriate use of
misdemeanor prosecutions” that would “hold responsible corporate officers accountable”
for food safety violations by their companies. Id.
15. Amiad Kushner, Applying the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine Outside
the Public Welfare Context, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 681, 693 (2003).
16. See Howard & Anderson, supra note 13.
17. See infra Part II.
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comparable factual scenarios have escaped criminal
prosecution.18
This Comment asserts that the current inconsistent
prosecution of corporate officers for the FDCA violations of
their companies demonstrates that the statute currently denies
food company corporate officers their due process rights under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution
because corporate officers may be convicted of a crime without
“fair warning” of the conduct that makes their actions criminal.19
Accordingly, the FDCA statute should be amended to remove
strict liability misdemeanor charges that allow for easy
convictions and potential prison time for corporate officers’
actions that have minimal culpability.
My argument that the FDCA statute denies responsible
corporate officers their due process right to fair warning is
proven in three parts.
Initially, this Comment provides
background on the development of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act and its creation of misdemeanor and felony
criminal charges for adulterating and distributing adulterated
food into interstate commerce.
Through an analysis of
Dotterweich and Park, Part I exposes how the Supreme Court
inappropriately strayed from the common law trend of requiring
criminal prosecutors to prove mens rea in food adulteration
cases to finding criminal liability if an individual has a
responsible relation to the cause of the food adulteration.
Part I argues that the FDCA improperly subjects
responsible corporate officers to strict-liability criminal
conviction based on the flawed justification that the crime is a
“public welfare offense.”
Responsible corporate officer
prosecution for food safety violations under the FDCA is not cut
and dry, as demonstrated by the calculus of guidelines
prosecutors consider before pursuing charges. Thus, applying
strict liability to FDCA misdemeanors based on a public welfare
offense justification produces unfair and unjust results.
18. Id.
19. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 457 (2001) (explaining that the United
States Supreme Court has often recognized the “basic principle that a criminal statute must
give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime”).
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Different than traffic offenses, the most common public welfare
offense, where violation of the statute is clear and requires the
individual charged with the crime to commit the act, responsible
corporate officer convictions do not require the corporate officer
to violate the statute but merely be in a position of responsibility
when the company’s food safety procedures fail.
In response to this theoretical problem, Part II reveals that
the current application of the prosecutorial guidelines
promulgated by the FDA and utilized by the DOJ provide
corporate officers minimal guidance regarding how their
conduct leads to criminal prosecution. Part II analyzes six major
food adulteration cases since 2014 and contemplates how DOJ
prosecutors have practically applied prosecutorial guidelines for
FDCA cases when considering whether to prosecute corporate
officers under the responsible corporate officer doctrine. These
case analyses demonstrate that the application of the current
guidelines is wildly inconsistent. Consequently, corporate
officers are unable to use recent food adulteration cases to guide
their compliance procedures and policies.
Thus, Part III of this Comment recommends that Congress
remove misdemeanor charges in the FDCA for food adulteration
crimes. Using the Chipotle foodborne illness outbreak incident
as an example, this portion of the Comment establishes that
removal of misdemeanor offenses under the FDCA would have
provided “fair warning” to Chipotle CEO Steve Ells as to what
conduct would subject him to criminal liability as a responsible
corporate officer of the company.

I. THE CREATION OF THE RESPONSIBLE
CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE
A. Statutory Authority to Pursue Criminal Charges
Under the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act.
Since 1938, American companies’ production and shipment
of food products has been regulated under the Federal Food,
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Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).20 One of the central reasons
for the passage of the Act was to ensure the safety of the
American food supply by prohibiting the production or shipment
of “adulterated” food.21 Section 331 of the FDCA accomplishes
this goal by prohibiting food companies from “adulterat[ing]”
food products or introducing, delivering, or receiving
“adulterated” food products in interstate commerce.22 One way
the Act considers a food to be “adulterated” is if the food “bears
or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance which may
render it injurious to health . . . or [] if it has been prepared,
packed, or held under unsanitary conditions whereby it may
have become contaminated with filth, or whereby it may have
been rendered injurious to health.”23
This definition of
“adulterated” encompasses food products that cause foodborne
illness.24 Accordingly, the FDA frequently cites this section of
the FDCA when notifying food companies of their food safety
violations and choosing to press charges in foodborne illness
cases.25
Although the FDA has authority under the FDCA to inspect
company premises related to “regulated activity,”26 the agency is
not authorized to prosecute criminal violations of the FDCA.27

20. See 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2015).
21. See Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985, 986 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act . . . is designed to ensure the safety of the food we eat by prohibiting the
sale of food that is ‘adulterated.’”).
22. 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2015).
23. 21 U.S.C. § 342 (2016).
24. See Helen Bottemiller Evich, Prosecutions Scare Food Industry, POLITICO (Oct.
9, 2013, 5:05 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/prosecutions-scare-foodindustry-098011 [https://perma.cc/VL3Z-X68A] (discussing the recent trend of the FDA
filing criminal charges against business leaders in the food industry for foodborne illness
outbreaks).
25. See BRENT J. GURNEY ET. AL., THE CRIME OF DOING NOTHING: STRICT
LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE OFFICERS UNDER THE FDCA, at F-9, F-10,
http://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/WilmerHale_Shared_Content/Files/Editorial/Pu
blication/The_Crime_of_Doing_Nothing.pdf [https://perma.cc/JD93-J2L7].
26. John W. Lundquist & Sandra L. Conroy, Defending Against Food and Drug Law
Prosecutions, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAW.: THE CHAMPION (July 1997),
https://www.nacdl.org/CHAMPION/ARTICLES/97jul02.htm
[https://perma.cc/5D8V66KD].
27. See Patrick O’Leary, Credible Deterrence: FDA and the Park Doctrine in the
21st Century, 68 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 137, 139 (2013).
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Rather, FDCA criminal prosecutions are tried by the DOJ.28
Accordingly, criminal prosecutions under the FDCA result from
FDA referral to the DOJ or by independent initiation of a federal
prosecutor.29 The DOJ has “absolute discretion” in civil and
criminal cases to decide when it is appropriate to prosecute or
enforce the statutory provisions of the FDCA.30
Where the DOJ has determined that a “person” has
introduced “adulterated” food into interstate commerce, the
FDCA “provides for a two-tiered system of criminal sanctions,
establishing a strict liability misdemeanor offense for violating
any of the prohibited-acts provisions under section 301 and a
more severe felony offense for second violations and violations
committed with ‘intent to defraud or mislead.’”31 Accordingly, a
person may be charged with a misdemeanor crime without
knowledge of—or intent to commit—the FDCA violation.32 If a
person is charged with a misdemeanor under section 333 of the
FDCA, the person “shall be imprisoned for not more than one
year or fined not more than $1,000, or both.”33 If the person is
charged with a felony on the other hand, the person “shall be
imprisoned for not more than three years or fined not more than
$10,000, or both.”34 These penalties, however, may be increased
significantly.35 For example, a misdemeanor fine may be
increased to a maximum of $500,000 if the violation results in
death.36

B. Park Doctrine Prosecutions: Imputing Liability on a
“Responsible Corporate Officer”
Strict liability offenses, such as the misdemeanor offense
for adulterated food in the FDCA statute, are commonly
28. Id. at 140.
29. Id.
30. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
31. O’Leary, supra note 27.
32. See id. at 139.
33. 21 U.S.C. § 333 (a)(1) (2016).
34. 21 U.S.C. § 333 (a)(1).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c)(4) (2016) (outlining fines for both individuals, which can be
increased to $100,000, and organizations, which can be increased to $500,000).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c)(4).
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criticized in the criminal law context.37 This is largely because
crime, as developed under the common law, generally includes
both an “evil-meaning mind” and an “evil-doing hand.”38
However, strict liability offenses dispense with the mental
culpability element and instead require only an act or omission
by the actor to trigger criminal liability.39 Many strict liability
offenses were established because the acts or omissions in
question were “public welfare offenses.”40 Public welfare
offenses in their original form were generally regulatory
offenses involving potential public harm that imposed light
penalties on individuals for violating the offense.41 Courts were
willing to “override the interest” of innocent defendants and
penalize them without proof of intent to commit the violation
because the harm caused to the public was direct and
widespread.42
In England, the sale of adulterated food was originally a
crime that required intent to commit the violation.43 However,
in Regina v. Woodrow, the Court of Exchequer diverted from the
common law norm of requiring criminal intent and held that an
individual that had purchased and distributed adulterated
tobacco without knowledge or reason to know it was adulterated
was still criminally liable.44 The English court stated that

37. See Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828, 830
(1999); Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV.
731, 731 (1960) (“The proliferation of so-called ‘strict liability’ offenses in the criminal law
has occasioned the vociferous, continued, and almost unanimous criticism of analysts and
philosophers of the law.”).
38. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952); Francis B. Sayre,
Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 55 (1933).
39. Sayre, supra note 38.
40. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 255. Public welfare offenses are thought to have been
created around “the middle of the nineteenth century. Before this, convictions for crime
without proof of a mens rea are to be found only occasionally, chiefly among the nuisance
cases.” Sayre, supra note 38, at 56.
41. Sayre, supra note 38, at 68; see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 61718 (1994) (“In rehearsing the characteristics of the public welfare offense, we, too, have
included in our consideration the punishments imposed and have noted that ‘penalties
commonly are relatively small, and conviction does no grave damage to an offender’s
reputation.’”).
42. Sayre, supra note 38, at 68.
43. Id. at 57-58.
44. Id. at 58.
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although dispensing with the criminal intent element “may
produce mischief because an innocent man may suffer from his
want of care in not examining the tobacco he has received, and
not taking a warranty; but the public inconvenience would be
much greater, if in every case the officers were obliged to prove
knowledge.”45 The doctrine of public welfare offenses is
believed to have begun with food adulteration cases such as
Woodrow.46
This doctrine failed to catch on in America until the middle
of the nineteenth century.47 At that time, state courts began to
dispense of the intent element in crimes that were the result of
violations of statutory regulations.48 In fact, the public welfare
offense doctrine became “firmly established” in food
adulteration cases in Massachusetts by the late nineteenth
century.49 As society became more complex and statutory
regulations increased, states increasingly took the public welfare
offense doctrine first developed in food adulteration cases and
began to apply it broadly to offenses such as traffic violations
that warranted small monetary penalties.50
Imposing strict liability grounded in the public welfare
offense theory can serve an extremely useful purpose. Look no
further than traffic violations. For example, in 1933, over a third
of the cases in Massachusetts courts were regarding traffic or
motor vehicle violations.51 That amounted to almost 70,000
cases in that year.52 As Francis Sayre points out in Public
Welfare Offenses, with a docket filled with traffic and motor
vehicle violations, it would be nearly impossible to “examine the
subjective intent of each defendant, even were such

45. Id.
46. Id. at 61.
47. Sayre, supra note 38, at 62; see also Andrew C. Hanson, Section 309(c) of the
Clean Water Act: Using the Model Penal Code to Clarify Mental State in Water Pollution
Crimes, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 731, 740 (2003).
48. Sayre, supra note 38, at 63.
49. Id. at 64.
50. Id. at 67; see also Hanson, supra note 47, at 731.
51. Sayre, supra note 38, at 69.
52. Id. at 69 n.49.

458

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:449

determination desirable.”53 Accordingly, strict liability in the
traffic offense context became a practical and effective solution.
However, when strict liability offenses impose substantial
punishment on innocent actors, the criminal punishment begins
to lose its sense of justice.54 Thus, following Sayre’s approach,
strict liability offenses based on the public welfare offense
doctrine should only be established when (1) the ability to
determine if the offense was committed can be done without
evidence of guilty intent and (2) the punishment for the offense
does not subject the offender to a prison sentence.55
Present misdemeanor prosecution of corporate officers
under the FDCA fails both of these standards. First, the
determination of whether the responsible corporate officer
violated the FDCA statute cannot be determined without
evidence of guilty intent because the corporate officer may not
be the actor that causes the violation of the statute.56 In traffic
offenses, the driver is the actor that has broken the speed limit or
driven without their lights on. By violating the statue,
intentionally or unintentionally, the driver of the car has
personally put the public at risk of harm. Thus, for the safety of
the public, we believe that promoting a safer community
outweighs the risk of imposing a small fine on an innocent
driver who violated the statute without intent.

53. Id. at 69.
54. Sayre, supra note 38, at 70. Sayre famously opines in his article that “[t]he sense
of justice of the community will not tolerate the infliction of punishment which is
substantial upon those innocent of intentional or negligent wrongdoing . . . .” Id. The
United States Supreme Court has echoed this sentiment stating, “In a system that generally
requires a ‘vicious will’ to establish a crime . . . imposing severe punishments for offenses
that require no mens rea would seem incongruous.” Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600,
616-17 (1994).
55. Sayre, supra note 38, at 72; see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,
253-57 (1952) (supporting Sayre’s public welfare offense elements by confirming that the
Court’s previously recognized public welfare offenses require “no mental element but
consist only of forbidden acts or omissions” and that the penalties imposed were “relatively
small” in a manner that would not cause “grave damage to [the] offender’s reputation.”);
Staples, 511 U.S. at 618.
56. See Kushner, supra note 15, at 695, 702-03 (“The primary concern of an officer
liability regime should be the distribution of liability among a class of potential officer
defendants, each member of which might have contributed to a corporate crime. The
classical form of the public welfare doctrine is unsuited to resolve this problem . . . .”).
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On the other hand, in a food adulteration case—such as
when a foodborne illness outbreak occurs that is traced back to a
large company—a corporate officer who is unaware that the
company’s products are adulterated may not personally put the
public at risk of harm. In fact, in some cases, the corporate
officer has no idea that the company is shipping adulterated food
in interstate commerce.57
This reasoning explains why
prosecutors currently consider multiple factors that require factintensive inquiry and balancing considerations to find the
responsible corporate officer criminally liable under the FDCA
statute.58 Consequently, to punish a corporate officer who has
not personally caused the public to be at risk of harm, solely
because she had control of the agent or the process that
ultimately caused the public to be at risk of harm undermines the
sense of justice and deterrence justifications that form the
foundation of the public welfare offense doctrine.59
One contention to this argument is that corporate
executives are held liable in other contexts for the misdeeds of
the corporation, so the food industry should be no different.
However, in most industries, criminal actions by the corporate
executive still require knowledge or willfulness as an element of
the crime.60 The FDCA is an exception to this rule.61 Further,
proponents of strict liability in FDCA cases argue that if
corporate executives are not held liable for their company’s
violations, justice may go unserved.62 However, a review of the
Chipotle case refutes this argument. Currently, Mr. Ells has not
been subjected to criminal liability for the Chipotle FDCA
57. See Bill Marler, If You Are a Manufacturer of Adulterated Food Can You Face
Fines
and
Jail?,
FORBES
(June
9,
2015,
7:53
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/billmarler/2015/06/09/if-you-are-a-manufacturer-ofadulterated-food-can-you-face-fines-and-jail/#628b52d32047
[https://perma.cc/9AJFBFNH].
58. See Kushner, supra note 15, at 694 n.88.
59. See Sayre, supra note 38, at 70; Staples, 511 U.S. at 616-17.
60. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254-56 (1952).
61. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281-83 (1943).
62. See Thomas Sullivan, The Park Doctrine and FDCA Violations: Holding
Corporate Executives Accountable, POL’Y & MEDICINE (Nov. 29, 2011, 6:43 AM),
http://www.policymed.com/2011/11/the-park-doctrine-and-fdca-violations-holdingcorporate-executives-accountable.html [https://perma.cc/6RGP-FB7P].
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violations.63 Nevertheless, Chipotle and Mr. Ells have suffered
severe consequences because of the company’s extensive food
safety violations.
Chiefly, profits for the company were down eighty-two
percent in 2016.64 The public corporation’s shares nose-dived
after the outbreak, plunging from $750 per share in 2013 to
$495.62 in 2015.65 Further, Mr. Ells, as of 2014, owned 339,474
shares.66 Thus, if Mr. Ells retained his stock during the
aftermath of the foodborne illness outbreak, Mr. Ells lost
approximately $86,000,000 in stock value, an enormous
punishment and deterrent against future food safety failures.
Accordingly, it is simply untrue to state that Chipotle or Mr. Ells
“escaped” repercussions of the company’s actions even if Mr.
Ells is not criminally charged under the FDCA. Importantly,
this result is unlikely to be cabined to Mr. Ells’ circumstance,
because most corporate officers now receive a majority of their
compensation in stock.67
Regardless, without proof of
knowledge or wrongful intent, it is manifestly unfair to place
criminal liability on an individual solely because she or he is a
corporate officer in responsible relation to the incident.
63. Chipotle has not yet faced any criminal charges for its foodborne illness
outbreak. See Alberto Luperon, Now Even the Feds Are Investigating Chipotle’s Virus
Outbreak, MEDIATE (Jan. 6, 2016, 1:57 PM), http://www.mediaite.com/online/feds-heychipotle-do-you-make-people-sick/ [https://perma.cc/EA2Q-AGFD].
However, the
company and its employees (like CEO Steve Ells) are currently under criminal
investigation for the outbreak. See Kim Janssen & Robert Channick, Feds Probing
Norovirus Outbreak at Chipotle, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 6, 2016, 4:31 PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-chipotle-criminal-investigation-20160106story.html [https://perma.cc/BAS9-MWWB].
64. See Jackie Wattles, Chipotle Profits Down 82% in Wake of E. Coli Outbreaks,
CNN
MONEY
(July
22,
2016,
8:54
AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/07/21/investing/chipotle-earnings/
[https://perma.cc/QS8BJGPB].
65. See Dan Flynn, Chipotle Outbreak Illness Count Hits 514 as CMG Stock Dives
Below
$500,
FOOD
SAFETY
NEWS
(Dec.
23,
2015),
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/12/chipotle-outbreak-illness-count-hits-514-as-cmgstock-dives-below-500/#.WLMDVzsrJPY [https://perma.cc/74XH-Q8SY].
66. See Brian Solomon, Why Chipotle’s Founder Isn’t a Burrito Billionaire (And
May
Never
Be),
FORBES
(July
22,
2014,
12:35
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2014/07/22/why-chipotles-founder-still-isnt-abillionaire-and-may-never-be/#7f0f4ad01557 [https://perma.cc/YG99-ENMG].
67. See Martin Zimmerman, GM and Ford Chief Executives Putting Their Salary on
the Line, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/dec/03/business/fiautopay3 [https://perma.cc/8TQL-2FH3].
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Corporate officers will undoubtedly face severe financial and
professional consequences without imposing the iron fist of the
Department of Justice.
Second, even under a misdemeanor charge, the officers
may be subject to a year in prison.68 Section 333(a) of the
FDCA articulates that:
(1) Any person who violates a provision of section 331 of
this title shall be imprisoned for not more than one year or
fined for not more than $1,000, or both.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this
section, if any person commits such a violation after a
conviction of him under this section has become final, or
commits such a violation with the intent to defraud or
mislead, such person shall be imprisoned for not more than
three years or fined not more than $10,000, or both.69

Thus, misdemeanor offenses under the FDCA provide
potential criminal liability that is substantial. Accordingly, the
current FDCA misdemeanor prosecution of responsible
corporate officers dispenses with the two most important
hallmarks of public welfare offenses.70 In its noble quest to
protect the public welfare, the United States Supreme Court has
forgotten the interest of innocent corporate officers by
sanctioning the prosecution of strict liability criminal offenses
regardless of whether a corporate officer knew they were
causing harm or how substantial the punishment the corporate
officer may suffer.71

1. Dotterweich: Guilty By “Reasonable Relation”
The United States Supreme Court first demonstrated a
willingness to hold corporate officers strictly liable for the
FDCA violations of their corporation under the public welfare

68. See 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (2015).
69. 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (emphasis added).
70. See David E. Frulla et al., Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine: Strict
Criminal Liability for Regulatory Violations, KELLEY DRYE (Oct. 24, 2013),
http://m.kelleydrye.com/publications/articles/1771 [https://perma.cc/9LPQ-UXV4].
71. Id.
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offense doctrine in United States v. Dotterweich.72 Buffalo
Pharmacal Company, Inc. (Buffalo), a drugs “jobber,”73
purchased prescription drugs from manufacturers and
repackaged them using their own label, before shipping the
drugs in interstate commerce.74 The company and Joseph
Dotterweich,75 president and general manager of Buffalo, were
prosecuted and convicted for shipping misbranded products and
an adulterated drug in interstate commerce.76 Mr. Dotterweich,
the top corporate officer of the company was found to have “had
no personal connection” with the shipments that resulted in the
prosecution.77 However, he was in “general charge” of the
corporation’s business and gave “general instructions” to the
company’s employees to fill the orders for the shipments.78 At
trial, the jury found that Mr. Dotterweich was guilty on all three
counts.79
On appeal before the United States Supreme Court,
Dotterweich argued that he could not be held criminally liable
for the FDCA violations of his company.80 His argument
followed that the FDCA’s reference to “any person” could not
implicate him as an agent for the company, because the term
“person” was limited to the corporation.81 Nevertheless, the
Court held that “[i]n the interest of the larger good it puts the
burden of acting at hazard a person otherwise innocent but
standing in responsible relation to a public danger.”82 In
signaling that the company’s FDCA violations were public
welfare offenses, the Dotterweich Court eliminated the
72. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281-83 (1943).
73. A drug “jobber” has been defined as “one who is involved with the legitimate
distribution of drugs to authorized outlets . . . .” See State v. Boisvert, 348 A.2d 7, 10 (Me.
1975).
74. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 278 (1943).
75. See United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., 131 F.2d 500, 501 (2d Cir. 1942).
76. See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278.
77. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., 131 F.2d at 501.
78. Id.
79. Id. It is interesting to note, that although Mr. Dotterweich was found guilty for
the counts of misbranding and adulteration of the drugs, the corporation was not found
guilty. Id.
80. See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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conventional requirement of awareness of some wrongdoing and
placed the statutory liability on individuals in responsible
relation to the act that causes a public harm.83 Thus, for the first
time under the FDCA, the Court affirmed that a corporate
officer could be subjected personally to criminal liability for the
acts of company employees that the corporate officer did not
know about or approve.84
The Dotterweich Court, however, chose not to define which
employees within a company may be considered in “responsible
relation” to public danger.85
Lower court cases after
Dotterweich held that the corporate official did not have to
personally commit the act causing the violation, know it
occurred, or be physically present when it occurred.86 Rather,
the Court left the determination of “responsible relation” to “the
good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and
the ultimate judgment of juries . . . .”87
Although Mr.
Dotterweich only received a $500 fine for each count and a
sixty-day probationary period,88 the Court’s responsible relation
holding opened the door wide open for the Park court to
establish the responsible corporate officer doctrine in food
adulteration cases.

2. Park: Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine in
Food Adulteration Cases
From 1934, when the Dotterweich decision was handed
down, until 1975, food industry counsel questioned whether
Dotterweich would apply to food adulteration cases under the
FDCA.89 However, the Park court dispensed with this notion
when it held that John Park, CEO of Acme Markets, Inc., a
national retail food chain with 874 retail locations and 36,000
83. See Daniel F. O’Keefe Jr. & Marc H. Shapiro, Personal Criminal Liability
Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act—The Dotterweich Doctrine, 30 FOOD
DRUG COSM. L.J. 5, 8 (1975).
84. Id.; Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281.
85. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285.
86. O’Keefe & Shapiro, supra note 83, at 19.
87. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285.
88. See U.S. v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281-83 (1943).
89. O’Keefe & Shapiro, supra note 83, at 18.
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employees, could be charged with a misdemeanor for
introducing adulterated food in interstate commerce.90 The
Supreme Court held that as a “responsible corporate offic[er],”
Mr. Park had the “power to prevent or correct violations of [the
FDCA’s] provisions.”91 Inspections at an Acme warehouse in
Baltimore uncovered evidence of rodent infestation of food
products.92 In January of 1972, the FDA notified Park by a letter
received at the corporation’s headquarters in Philadelphia of the
conditions in violation of the FDCA.93 Mr. Park spoke with
other executives of the company who assured him that the vicepresident of that location would take care of the problems.94
After a second FDA inspection in March 1972 revealed similar
conditions, the DOJ filed charges against the corporation and
Mr. Park under the FDCA.95
Park argued at trial that through his responsibilities as CEO
of a large company, he was not personally involved in the
FDCA violation.96 Further, Park argued that he had done all he
could do to remedy the violations.97 Nevertheless, the jury
found Park guilty of all charges against him.98 He was
sentenced to pay a fine of fifty dollars on each count.99 On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court held the conviction was
proper because the FDCA imposed a duty on “responsible
corporate agents” “to seek out and remedy violations when they
occur” and “to implement measures that will ensure that
violations will not occur.”100
The Court noted that an FDCA charge cannot be brought
against a corporate officer simply because of the officer’s
90. S. Prakash Sethi & Robert W. Katz, The Expanding Scope of Personal Criminal
Liability of Corporate Executives—Some Implications of United States v. Park, 32 FOOD
DRUG COSM. L.J. 544, 545-47 (1977); see also United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 676-77
(1975).
91. Park, 421 U.S. at 676.
92. Id. at 660.
93. Id. at 661-62.
94. O’Keefe & Shapiro, supra note 83, at 21.
95. See Park, 421 U.S. at 662.
96. Id. at 676 n.17.
97. Id. at 664.
98. Id. at 666.
99. Id.
100. Park, 421 U.S. at 672; Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285.
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position in the company, but only if the jury finds the individual
“had authority and responsibility to deal with the situation.”101
Thus, after Park, for the DOJ to get a conviction against a
responsible corporate officer resulting in a potential prison
sentence and/or extensive fines, the DOJ only has to prove that
“the defendant had, by reason of his position in the corporation,
responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first instance,
or promptly to correct, the violation complained of . . . .”102 The
Government does not have to prove “wrongful action.”103
Notably, the punishment in Dotterweich and Park was minimal,
each receiving a fine for less than $1,000 and serving no prison
time.104 However, as discussed above, the stakes for criminal
prosecution under the current FDCA is much higher.105
During the Park litigation, a critical concern raised but not
recognized as a crucial part of the resolution of the case was the
possibility that imposing liability on responsible corporate
officers would result in criminal prosecution that allowed the
DOJ to enforce the statute without consistently applying
guidelines or standards.106
Those in opposition to the
Government’s “responsible corporate officer” test argued this
rule would result in unfair prosecution based simply on the title

101. Park, 421 U.S. at 674. The court recognized the defendant may raise a defense
claiming the defendant was “‘powerless’ to prevent or correct the violation.” Id. at 673
(quoting United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co., 376 U.S. 86, 91 (1964)).
102. Id. at 673-74.
103. Id. at 673.
104. See Park, 421 U.S. at 666; United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., 131 F.2d
500, 501 (2d Cir. 1942).
105. See infra Part II.
106. See Joshua D. Greenberg & Ellen C. Brotman, Strict Vicarious Liability for
Corporations and Corporate Executives: Stretching the Boundaries of Criminalization, 51
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 79, 93 (2014) (“Because the FDA’s ‘guidance’ provides none, the
agency is effectively mirroring the approach taken in Dotterweich, where the Supreme
Court relied on ‘conscience and circumspection in prosecuting officers’ to decide when to
hold company executives strictly liable under the FDCA. Prosecutors have unfettered
discretion to bring Park doctrine cases as a result, which creates reason for substantial fear
and uncertainty among corporate executives in industries regulated by the FDA.”).
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of an individual’s job rather than their wrongful conduct.107
Nevertheless, the Court opted to follow the Government’s
responsible corporate officer test,108 which has resulted in
arbitrary and inconsistent prosecution of food adulteration cases
and has denied corporate officers a “fair warning” of what
guidelines the DOJ actually uses to determine when prosecution
is appropriate.109
Currently the FDCA statutory text is silent regarding when
a “responsible corporate officer” should be prosecuted under the
statute.110 However, the FDA has fashioned a set of guidelines
prosecutors are provided to consider when deciding whether to
charge the corporate officers for the FDCA violations of their
company.111 The FDA Regulatory Procedures Manual lists
seven (non-exclusive) relevant factors prosecutors should
consider in responsible corporate officer prosecutions under the
FDCA including:
(1) Whether the violation involves actual or potential harm
to the public;
(2) Whether the violation is obvious;
(3) Whether the violation reflects a pattern of illegal
behavior and/or failure to heed prior warnings;
(4) Whether the violation is widespread;
(5) Whether the violation is serious;
(6) The quality of the legal and factual support for the
proposed prosecution; and
(7) Whether the proposed prosecution is a prudent use of
agency resources.112

107. Sethi & Katz, supra note 90, at 559. In their amicus brief, the Grocery
Manufacturers of America argued that following the responsible corporate officer test
“would expose corporate officers to criminal prosecution at the bureaucratic discretion of
enforcement officials without . . . ‘guidelines,’ ‘criteria,’ or ‘standards,’” which would
authorize “harsh and arbitrary criminal prosecutions under the Act, based on corporate
status rather than individual ‘wrongful action’ . . . .” Id.
108. See Park, 421 U.S. at 669-70.
109. See Sethi & Katz, supra note 90, at 559-60.
110. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL, at 6-48
(2015),
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresManual/default.htm
[https://perma.cc/D6CC-FBKY].
111. Id. at 6-48 to -49.
112. Id.
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These factors, as they currently exist, are non-exclusive and
provide prosecutorial discretion mandated by the Court.113
However, looking at recent foodborne illness cases, as we will
do in Part II, these factors have been applied in an extremely
inconsistent manner to the point that each decision by the DOJ
to prosecute or not is largely unpredictable and fails to provide
“fair warning” as to what actions or omissions responsible
corporate officers will be charged for under the statute.114

II. FAIR WARNING OR JUMBLED MESS: HOW
RECENT FOOD ADULTERATION CASES PROVIDE
LITTLE GUIDANCE OF WHAT ACTIONS WILL BE
PROSECUTED UNDER THE STATUTE
Since 2013, there have been six major foodborne illness
incidents that present comparable factual scenarios. The cases
include food companies Jensen Farms, Quality Egg LLC, Peanut
Corporation of America, Glass Onion, Townsend Farms/Costco,
and Bidart Brothers. Although the DOJ opted to prosecute
“responsible corporate officers” at three of these companies for
the companies’ FDCA violations, they did not pursue
prosecution against the responsible corporate officers at the
other three companies. Importantly, prosecutors acting under
the FDCA have prosecutorial discretion to determine which
cases to prosecute.115 However, prosecutorial discretion cannot
dispense with the constitutional guarantee of “fair warning” to
provide a person of ordinary intelligence with an understanding
of what actions will result in criminal liability under the
statute.116
The current FDCA language does not provide clear
guidance of specific actions or omissions that if taken by a
responsible corporate officer, will result in their personal
criminal liability.117 As discussed in Part I, this is because the

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
See infra Part II.
See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
See id. at 830-31.
See supra Section I.A.
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misdemeanor offense under the statute is a strict liability offense
that only requires the commission of the criminal violation
stated in the statute.118 Thus, responsible corporate officers only
have prior foodborne illness outbreaks and FDA/DOJ actions
regarding those outbreaks to provide them “fair warning” of
which actions by their companies will result in subjection to
criminal liability.
Unfortunately, the six cases below all involved significant
violations of the FDCA.119 Thus, consistently applying strict
liability based on the public welfare offense doctrine would
dictate that responsible corporate officers in all six cases should
have been prosecuted.120 However, all six cases were not treated
comparably by the DOJ.121 The case analyses below demonstrate
that the executives that were prosecuted all knew or should have
known of company procedures that eventually led to the
foodborne illness outbreak.122 On the other hand, the executives
who were not prosecuted had minimal knowledge, at most, of
company procedures or operations that led to the eventual
foodborne illness outbreak.123 This practical conclusion further
supports this article’s proposed solution that the FDCA strict
liability standard for misdemeanor crimes should be removed
and replaced with a mens rea requirement.

A. Executives Prosecuted
1. Jensen Farms
In June of 2011, Eric and Ryan Jensen, the owners of
Jensen Farms in Granada, Colorado, installed and maintained a
processing center for cantaloupes produced on their farm.124 The
processing center included a conveyor system that was designed
118. See supra Section I.A.
119. See infra Sections II.A-C.
120. See infra Sections II.A-C.
121. See infra Sections II.A-C.
122. See infra Section II.A.
123. See infra Section II.B.
124. Rule 11(c)(1)(A) and (B) Plea Agreement and Statement of Facts Relevant to
Sentencing at 6, United States v. Jensen, No. 13-mj-01138-MEH (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2013),
http://www.defenselitigationinsider.com/files/2015/01/US-v-Jensen-COP.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W8QV-EVM7].
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to clean, cool, and package the cantaloupes for distribution
throughout the country.125 Specifically, if functioning properly,
the conveyor system would sufficiently wash the fruit with antibacterial solution to prevent adulteration.126 Jensen Farms
acquired the conveyor system, originally designed for harvesting
potatoes, in May 2011.127 The company supplying the conveyor
system modified the equipment to include a catch pan to support
a chlorine spray function, which would have reduced the risk of
microbial contamination of fruit.128 However, the Jensen
brothers chose not to set up the chlorine spray function.129 On
July 29, 2011, a retailer received pallets of cantaloupes that were
adulterated with Listeria from a Jensen Farms packaging
facility.130 Retailers distributed the cantaloupe to stores located
in twenty-eight states causing 147 foodborne illnesses, thirtythree known deaths, and ten other deaths that were likely
related.131
The Colorado Department of Health and Environment
(CDHE) notified the CDC and the FDA of the astronomical
increase in average number of Listeria cases in September.132
The CDHE pinpointed that all patients infected with Listeria
reported eating cantaloupe before they experienced the
symptoms.133 In response, the FDA sampled Jensen Farms
cantaloupes and found that the fruit tested positive for the strain
of Listeria found in all of the infected patients.134 Further, the
FDA found that multiple locations throughout the Jensen Farms
packing and storage facility were positive for the strain found in
the outbreak victims.135 On September 14, 2011, the Jensen’s
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 7.
128. Id.
129. See Rule 11(c)(1)(A) and (B) Plea Agreement and Statement of Facts Relevant
to Sentencing, supra note 124, at 7.
130. Id. at 7-8.
131. Id. at 14.
132. Id. at 12-13.
133. Id. at 13.
134. See Rule 11(c)(1)(A) and (B) Plea Agreement and Statement of Facts Relevant
to Sentencing, supra note 124, at 13.
135. Id.
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took action by attempting to recall shipments of cantaloupes.136
Nevertheless, on October 18, 2011, the FDA issued a warning
letter concluding that Jensen Farms had widespread
contamination throughout the facility that demonstrated poor
sanitary practices.137 An FDA Senior Adviser stated that
“Jensen Farms significantly deviated from industry standards by
failing to use an anti-microbial . . . in the packing of their
cantaloupes . . . .”138 As a result, the U.S. Attorney’s Office
brought federal charges against the Jensen brothers for
Introduction of an Adulterated Food into Interstate
Commerce.139 The Jensen brothers eventually plead guilty to
misdemeanor counts.140 Their indictment called for penalties of
up to six years in prison and $1.5 million in fines.141
Applying the prosecutorial guidelines, it is clear that an
FDCA violation resulted in actual harm under Section 331 of the
FDCA.142 In fact, some have referred to the outbreak as one of
the most severe foodborne illness outbreaks in U.S. history.143
Second, the violation could be deemed obvious. The Jensen
brothers knew that the cantaloupe needed to be cleaned
properly.144 However, the brothers were grossly negligent by
failing to set up the chlorine wash that would have killed the
bacteria that ultimately adulterated their produce.145 Third, the
Jensen Farms case does not reflect a pattern of illegal behavior
or a failure to heed previous warnings by the Jensen brothers as

136. Id.
137. Id. at 13-14.
138. Id. at 14.
139. See Rule 11(c)(1)(A) and (B) Plea Agreement and Statement of Facts Relevant
to Sentencing, supra note 124, at 3-4.
140. Id. at 1.
141. Id. at 4-5.
142. Id. at 3-4.
143. See Scott Bronstein & Drew Griffin, Third-deadliest U.S. Food Outbreak Was
Preventable,
Experts
Say,
CNN
(May
3,
2012,
9:21
AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/03/health/listeria-outbreak-investigation
/http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/03/health/listeria-outbreak-investigation/
[https://perma.cc/VP48-H778].
144. See Rule 11(c)(1)(A) and (B) Plea Agreement and Statement of Facts Relevant
to Sentencing, supra note 124, at 7.
145. Id.
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corporate officers of the company.146 Rather, the criminal
incidents occurred only after Jensen Farms implemented its new
conveyor system.147 They only received a warning letter from
the FDA after many of the foodborne illnesses were reported to
public health officials.148 Fourth, the violation was widespread
and impacted consumers in twenty-eight states.149 The result of
shipping adulterated food in interstate commerce was serious as
thirty-three consumers died and a total of 147 individuals
reported outbreak-associated illnesses.150 Fifth, the factual proof
of this case was strong because the Jensen brothers were aware
of the need to use the chlorine wash to eradicate the cantaloupe
of the harmful bacteria but knowingly failed to implement the
chlorine wash procedures while continuing to sell the fruit
around the country.151
Thus, DOJ prosecuting attorneys had a strong argument
that the Jensen brothers’ prosecution was a prudent use of
agency resources.152 Accordingly, following the prosecutorial
guidelines, this was an easy case. It involved two owners
intimately involved in the operations of their farm.153 It
involved obvious procedural guards that the owners failed to
implement and it involved violations that resulted in the death of
thirty-three consumers.154

2. Quality Egg, LLC
In August 2010, eggs containing Salmonella bacteria
sickened thousands of consumers around the country.155 The
table eggs were traced back to Quality Egg, LLC (Quality Egg),
146. See id. (describing the illegal activity of the Jensen brothers, but not mentioning
any previous illegal activity).
147. Id. at 7-12.
148. Id. at 13-14.
149. Rule 11(c)(1)(A) and (B) Plea Agreement and Statement of Facts Relevant to
Sentencing, supra note 124, at 14.
150. See id.
151. Id. at 7.
152. Id. at 12-14.
153. Id. at 6-7.
154. Rule 11(c)(1)(A) and (B) Plea Agreement and Statement of Facts Relevant to
Sentencing, supra note 124, at 14.
155. United States v. DeCoster, 828 F.3d 626, 630 (8th Cir. 2016).
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a company run by executives Austin DeCoster and Peter
DeCoster.156 The trial court found that Austin DeCoster had
substantial control over Quality Egg and its assets.157 Peter
DeCoster was found to have “some control” over the production
and distribution of shell eggs by the company.158 In 2010, 1,939
individuals reported illnesses and/or cases of Salmonella
infection associated with the Quality Egg outbreak.159 The
DeCosters maintain that they did not have any knowledge
during the time of the Salmonella outbreak that the eggs their
company sold were contaminated.160
However, investigation into the Quality Egg case revealed
that the company had commissioned tests to detect Salmonella
and the results of the test came back positive on forty-seven
percent of the days tested.161 Furthermore, the frequency of the
test results grew in the months leading up to its recall.162 Quality
Egg issued a recall, the largest recall of table eggs in U.S.
history.163 After the company’s recall, the FDA conducted a
follow-up inspection finding unsanitary conditions including
dead insects and fecal material pervasive in the facilities.164
Following its inspection, the FDA issued Quality Egg an
inspectional report detailing their observations.165 However,
Quality Egg failed to implement and follow its written
Salmonella prevention plan.166 As a result, the DeCosters were
prosecuted under Section 331 of the FDCA for shipping and
selling shell eggs that contained Salmonella in interstate
156. United States v. Quality Egg, LLC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 920, 923 (N.D. Iowa 2015).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 925.
159. Id. at 926.
160. Id.
161. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Quality Egg, Company Owner, and Top
Executive Sentenced in Connection with Distribution of Adulterated Eggs (Apr. 13, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/quality-egg-company-owner-and-top-executive-sentencedconnection-distribution-adulterated [https://perma.cc/B4LP-E3LP].
162. Id.
163. Dan Flynn, Egg Men Get Extra Time to File for Review with Supreme Court,
FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2016/12/decostersget-extra-time-to-file-for-review-with-supreme-court/#.WPaIE1KZPVo
[https://perma.cc/W67S-BBCN].
164. United States v. Quality Egg, LLC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 920, 926 (N.D. Iowa 2015).
165. Id. at 931.
166. Id.
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commerce as responsible corporate officers.167 The DeCosters
reached a plea agreement with the DOJ to plead guilty to one
strict liability misdemeanor and paid a $100,000 fine.168 The
two men were each sentenced to three months in prison.169
Applying the prosecutorial guidelines here, first, Quality
Egg’s adulteration of its table eggs resulted in serious physical
harm to 1,939 individuals around the country. Second, the
violation was obvious.170 Not only did FDA investigations find
that Quality Egg facilities in Iowa were extremely unsanitary,
there was also evidence that established that Quality Egg knew
that its facilities and products were testing positive for
Salmonella.171 Third, Quality Egg’s failure to implement its
written Salmonella eradication plan the company proffered to
the FDA after facility inspection exposed rampant Salmonella
contamination, was just one bad act in a pattern of illegal
behavior by Quality Egg and the DeCosters.172 Quality Egg was
also found to have misbranded their egg products and had
previously bribed USDA inspectors.173 Furthermore, Peter
DeCoster had previously been convicted of falsifying driving
logs within another business.174 The facts as applied to the
guidelines strongly weighed against the DeCosters in the
determination of their conviction. Additionally, their violation
was widespread.175 The adulterated eggs had injured individuals
in ten different states.176 Further, the USDA had investigated
and allowed Quality Egg the opportunity to fix the identified
sanitation issues.177 However, Quality Egg failed to implement
its designated correction plans.178 This provided plenty of legal
and factual support for the prosecution of the DeCosters. Thus,
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 924.
See United States v. DeCoster, 828 F.3d 626, 631 (8th Cir. 2016).
Id.
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 161.
DeCoster, 828 F.3d at 631.
United States v. Quality Egg, LLC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 920, 931 (N.D. Iowa 2015).
Id. at 945-46.
Id. at 943.
Id. at 932.
Id. at 923.
United States v. DeCoster, 828 F.3d 626, 630 (8th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 630-31.
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it follows that this open and shut case was also a prudent use for
agency resources.

3. Peanut Corporation of America
In 2009, a Salmonella outbreak resulted from a peanut
butter paste that was manufactured by the Peanut Corporation of
America.179 The outbreak killed nine people and sickened
another 714 consumers across forty-six states.180 The outbreak
was considered the deadliest Salmonella outbreak in recent
history.181 The outbreak also resulted in a huge food recall that
spanned from cookies to airline snacks.182 In contrast to the two
cases above, in this case there was clear evidence that Stewart
Parnell, the owner and president of the peanut processing
company, knew that his products were adulterated and chose to
distribute the products anyway.183
After the Salmonella
outbreak began to spread, the FDA identified that the processing
company’s plant was rife with “mold, roaches, dirty equipment,
holes big enough to allow rodents inside and a failure to separate
raw and cooked products.”184 The company’s own Salmonella
testing had reported contamination six times over the years.185
Because Parnell knew of the adulterated product, he was
charged with a felony rather than a misdemeanor under the

179. Kevin McCoy, Peanut Exec. in Salmonella Case Gets 28 Years, USA TODAY
(Sept.
21,
2015,
5:39
AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/09/21/peanut-executive-salmonellasentencing/72549166 [https://perma.cc/UW8D-EHJN].
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Lindsey Bever, Former Peanut Plant Executive Faces Life Sentence for Lethal
Salmonella
Coverup,
WASH.
POST
(July
24,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/07/24/former-peanut-plantexecutive-faces-life-sentence-for-selling-salmonella-taintedfood/?utm_term=.0276f4b456df [https://perma.cc/8C5K-YYAM].
184. Brady Dennis, Executive Who Shipped Tainted Peanuts Gets 28 Years; 9 Died
of
Salmonella,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
21,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/a-life-sentence-for-shippingtainted-peanuts-victims-families-say-yes/2015/09/19/e844a314-5bf1-11e5-8e9edce8a2a2a679_story.html?utm_term=.a17939054a0f [https://perma.cc/6FSG-THLH].
185. Bever, supra note 183.
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statute.186 Parnell also received a twenty-eight-year prison
sentence.187
Applying the prosecutorial guidelines here, the violation
clearly resulted in actual harm to hundreds of individuals across
the country.188 Additionally, the adulterated peanut paste was
obvious because the company’s Salmonella testing had
produced positive results at least six times during the time frame
of the outbreak.189 Further, Mr. Parnell was aware of the
Salmonella problems and chose to ship the products in interstate
commerce.190 Mr. Parnell’s knowledge of the Salmonella
presence and his choice to knowingly distribute the products is
what makes this case extremely egregious. His statements and
actions clearly reflect that he was aware of the Salmonella
contamination and chose not to take preventative measures to
protect consumers. The adulteration of the peanut paste was
widespread and serious and there was plenty of factual evidence
to demonstrate that Mr. Parnell knew of the food adulteration
and chose to insert the product into the food supply. Thus, it is
unlikely anyone could say that prosecution of Mr. Parnell would
be an unwise use of agency resources. On the contrary, Mr.
Parnell is precisely the type of company executive who this
Comment advocates should face felony charges.191

186. Sindhu Sundar, DOJ Toughens Stance on Food Execs in Peanut Corp. Case,
LAW360 (Sept. 11, 2015, 10:58 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/701880/dojtoughens-stance-on-food-execs-in-peanut-corp-case [https://perma.cc/2UPY-YF62].
187. McCoy, supra note 179.
188. Id.
189. Georgia Peanut Plant Manager Testifies That Company Faked Salmonella
Tests,
N.Y.
DAILY
NEWS
(Aug.
8,
2014,
6:09
PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/georgia-peanut-plant-manager-testifiescompany-faked-salmonella-tests-article-1.1897287 [https://perma.cc/8YQT-86FP].
190. McCoy, supra note 179.
191. Thus far, this Comment has presented analyses of three cases that provide
factor-by-factor explanations of why the company executives should face prosecution for
the food safety outbreaks of their company. Importantly, this Comment does not question
why those individuals face prosecution. Rather, this Comment is more concerned with the
recent cases that seemingly present comparable factual issues regarding FDCA violations
and harm done, but the Department of Justice has chosen to forgo prosecution. This
Comment does not question that prosecutors have discretion to bring cases; however, this
Comment is concerned that a failure to consistently prosecute executives for the food
safety outbreaks of their company fails to provide fair warning of when company
executives will be prosecuted for the food safety violations of their company.
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B. Executives Not Prosecuted
1. Glass Onion
In 2013, thirty-three consumers across four states
contracted E. coli that was traced back to pre-packaged salads
sold at Trader Joes.192 Nine consumers were hospitalized and
two consumers developed hemolytic uremic syndrome, a
potentially fatal kidney disease associated with E. coli
infections.193 The products were produced by Atherstone Foods
Inc., which was manufacturing the products under the name
Glass Onion Catering.194 The California Department of Public
Health investigated Glass Onion facilities but did not find any
food safety violations.195
Investigators also tested the
procedures and took environmental samples from the location
where Glass Onion sourced its romaine lettuce and did not find a
genetic match of the strain that caused the outbreak.196 The
health inspectors were not able to locate where the E. coli strain
in question originated.197
Applying the prosecutorial guidelines here, the adulterated
salads produced by Glass Onion caused actual harm to thirtythree individuals across four states.198 However, the violation
was not obvious.199 Neither Glass Onion nor its source of
romaine lettuce were found to have conclusively committed an
adulteration violation under the FDCA.200 Further, there is no
evidence that there was a pattern of illegal behavior or a failure
to heed regulatory warnings.201
On the contrary, after notice of the violation, both Glass
Onion and its lettuce supplier implemented further procedures
192. CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF AN
ESCHERICHIA COLI O157:H7 OUTBREAK IN OCTOBER 2013 ASSOCIATED WITH PREPACKAGED SALADS 6 (2014).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 5, 7.
195. Id. at 5.
196. Id.
197. CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH , supra note 192, at 5.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 12.
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that would limit the possibility of outbreak.202 However, under
the misdemeanor charge, all the prosecutors would have to
prove is that the adulterated product was distributed by Glass
Onion.203 This seems absurd in a case such as this because Glass
Onion and its produce supplier appear to be wholly innocent.
Importantly, this violation is serious. Thirty-three individuals
contracted illness because of the adulterated food product.204
Further, there is factual evidence that creates a case that Glass
Onion distributed an adulterated product in interstate
commerce.205
Admittedly, in this case it is much less clear whether
prosecuting Glass Onion would be prudent. On one hand, as the
protector of the American food supply, the DOJ needs to make it
clear that it will not tolerate the sale of adulterated food,
regardless of whether the company was aware that their
procedures would result in such an outcome. On the other hand,
Glass Onion has not been shown to have done anything
wrong.206 In fact, the company appears to be squeaky clean and
worked diligently to fight the outbreak.207
Accordingly,
prosecutorial opinion may vary on whether it would be a prudent
use of resources to prosecute Glass Onion.

2. Townsend Farms/Costco
In 2013, 162 consumers were confirmed to have contracted
Hepatitis A after eating Townsend Farms Organic Antioxidant
Blend.208 The cases spanned ten states touching both coasts.209
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, supra note 192, at 12.
See id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 5.
CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, supra note 192, at 12.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA INVESTIGATES MULTISTATE OUTBREAK OF
HEPATITIS A ILLNESS ASSOCIATED WITH POMEGRANATE SEEDS FROM TURKISH
IMPORTER
(2013),
http://www.fda.gov/Food/RecallsOutbreaksEmergencies/Outbreaks/ucm354698.htm
[https://perma.cc/6UJ5-35RV].
209. CDC Updates Hepatitis A Outbreak Numbers: 159 Ill in 10 States, FOOD
SAFETY NEWS (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/08/cdc-updateshepatitis-a-outbreak-numbers-159-ill-in-10-states/#.WIaH8k0zWUk
[https://perma.cc/YAV3-92FP].
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Sixty-nine individuals had cases so severe that they were
hospitalized.210 Additionally, in a California class action,
roughly 25,000 individuals alleged injury.211 Townsend Farms
quickly ordered a recall of the product.212 Public health officials
ultimately concluded that the adulterated pomegranate seeds
were imported from Turkey.213 There is no evidence currently
that the Townsend Farm executives knew of the adulterated
product.214
Applying the prosecutorial guidelines, Townsend Farms’
FDCA violation of distributing adulterated food products in
interstate commerce resulted in severe and widespread harm to
allegedly 25,000 individuals.215 The evidence of injury to those
individuals as a result of consuming a Townsend Farm’s product
is very strong.216 On the other hand, there is little evidence that
suggests that Townsend Farms had repeatedly failed to adhere to
warnings or can be shown to have a pattern of misbehavior.217
Finally, if the incident caused injury to thousands of consumers,
prosecution seems like it would be a prudent way to send a
message to food producers and food executives that the
government will not allow them to distribute food that is
adulterated.218 However, to this point, no criminal action has
been filed.219
210. Id.
211. Coral Beach, Costco Offers Vaccines, Denies Liability and Declares Dividend,
FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2016/04/costcooffers-hep-a-vaccines-for-current-outbreak-denies-liability-for-2013-outbreak-frozen-fruitimplicated-both-times/ [https://perma.cc/6UCG-WB2D].
212. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 208.
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. See Beach, supra note 211.
216. See Multistate Outbreak of Hepatitis A Virus Infections Linked to Pomegranate
Seeds from Turkey (Final Update), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Oct. 28,
2013,
4:30
PM),
https://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/outbreaks/2013/a1b-03-31/
[https://perma.cc/BK7F-Q5FG] (discussing number of victims and spread of infection from
specific source).
217. See id. (stating that infection was linked to one contaminated shipment of seeds
not negligence on part of Townsend).
218. See Flynn, supra note 14.
219. See Bill Marler, Food “Crimes”—When to Prosecute and When to Not?,
FORBES
(July
18,
2015,
10:21
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/billmarler/2015/07/18/food-crimes-when-to-prosecute-andwhen-to-not/#53065df61b3d [https://perma.cc/585Q-7SRS].
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3. Bidart Brothers
In 2014, thirty-five consumers reported illness from
Listeria after eating whole caramel apples.220 The Listeria
outbreak spanned twelve states and caused thirty-four of the
thirty-five consumers to be hospitalized.221 Seven of the
consumers died.222 Eleven of the illnesses were pregnancyrelated and one of the illnesses resulted in fetal loss.223
Ultimately, the public health officials traced the Listeria
outbreak to Bidart Brothers, an apple producer in California.224
Investigators found the Listeria on farm tools, packing drains,
and on the automatic packing line.225 Additionally, inspectors
identified that the packing equipment was constructed in a
manner that prevented the equipment from being properly
cleaned.226 While there is little evidence regarding how much
the farm owners knew about the potential adulteration of their
apples, this case sounds eerily similar to the Jensen Farms case.
Nevertheless, Bidart Brothers executives have avoided
prosecution thus far.227
Applying the prosecutorial guidelines here, Bidart Brothers
shipping of apples that contained adulterated products resulted
in a severe, widespread, and serious violation of the FDCA.228
Further, public health agencies were able to link the foodborne
illness to the farm’s unsanitary conditions.229 Although there
was no evidence that Bidart Brothers failed to heed warnings,
nor was this a step in a line of illegal actions, this case would
220. See Dan Flynn, Inspectors Find Listeria at Bidart Bros. Cooling and Packing
House,
FOOD
SAFETY
NEWS
(May
27,
2015),
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/05/bidart-bros-cooling-and-packing-house-sampleswere-positive-for-listeria/#.WIaIXU0zWUk [https://perma.cc/V3EM-VCX2].
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. FDA Investigated Listeria Monocytogenes Illness Linked to Caramel Apples,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.
(Aug.
21,
2015),
https://www.fda.gov/Food/RecallsOutbreaksEmergencies/Outbreaks/ucm427573.htm
[https://perma.cc/ANN8-F57T].
224. See Flynn, supra note 220.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See supra Section I.D.
229. Flynn, supra note 220.
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provide another opportunity to enforce the importance of food
safety through the FDCA.230 Thus, this seems as if prosecution
would be a prudent use of agency resources. However, the
Department of Justice has chosen not to do so.231

C. Case Analyses Summary
In summary, the case analyses demonstrate that there is
little distinction in evidence of food adulteration or injury result
between cases where the Department of Justice has chosen to
prosecute food safety executives and those cases where no
criminal action has been taken.232 The one conclusion that can
be drawn from all cases where the company executives were
prosecuted is that all of those cases present evidence that the
executive knew or should have known about circumstances that
could have led to the cause of the food adulteration but chose to
do nothing about it.233 In Jensen Farms, the brothers knew they
should have been using the chlorine spray but chose not to
implement the practice.234 In Quality Egg, the executives knew
of the unsanitary conditions reported by investigators but took
no action to remedy the problems.235 In Peanut Corporation of
America, Mr. Parnell knew of the failing Salmonella test but
chose to ship the products without confirmation that the
shipment was Salmonella free.236 Each executive knew to some
degree about the eventual cause of the outbreak. Arguably each
case could have been brought under a felony charge.
On the other hand, the cases that have not been prosecuted,
present clear evidence that each company distributed adulterated
food in interstate commerce.237 In the Bidart Brothers case, the
facility investigation even showed unsanitary conditions that led
to the eventual outbreak, however, no charges were filed.238 As
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id.
Id.
See supra Sections II.A-B.
See Id.
See supra Section II.A.1.
See supra Section II.A.2.
See supra Section II.A.3.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra Section II.B.3.
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a result, determining when food company executives will be
prosecuted under the current statute is unpredictable even with
the prosecutorial guidelines.

III. HOW REMOVING THE STRICT LIABILITY
MISDEMEANOR OFFENSE FOR FOOD
ADULTERATION CASES WOULD SATISFY THE
FAIR WARNING REQUIREMENT OF THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE
After reviewing the cases, it is clear the prosecutorial
guidelines should remain in place. However, prosecution under
the statute will be more just and predictable by eliminating the
strict liability misdemeanor offense for food adulteration under
the FDCA. To explain how this would bring clear results, we
will return to the Chipotle case one final time.
In 2015, at least sixty consumers suffered illness across
fourteen states resulting from E. coli contamination contracted
after eating at Chipotle.239 Public Health officials have not been
able to trace which specific ingredient caused the E. coli
outbreak.240 Some experts assert that a contributing factor in the
Chipotle outbreak may have been systemic failures in food
handling, food preparation, and employee hygiene.241
Nevertheless, under the responsible corporate officer doctrine,
Chipotle CEO Steve Ells may be prosecuted because his
company shipped adulterated food in interstate commerce. The
current statute for misdemeanor charges only requires that Mr.
Ells be in a position of responsible relation to the company’s
foodborne illness outbreak.242
However, by eliminating the strict liability misdemeanor
charge and leaving the felony charge requiring knowledge of the
cause of the food adulteration, prosecutors would only be able to
239. See Beach, supra note 8.
240. Id.
241. Samantha Masunaga, What Went Wrong at Chipotle? Food Safety Expert
Trevor Suslow Breaks It Down, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2016, 3:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-qa-food-safety-20160317-story.html
[https://perma.cc/LG34-SRG2].
242. See supra Part I.D.
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convict Mr. Ells if he knew that a company procedure or failure
to implement a company procedure contributed to the
company’s food product becoming contaminated with E. coli.
This would properly punish executives for their actual
wrongdoing. The deterrence rationale would serve its purpose
in criminalizing Mr. Ells’ actions. However, this change would
also protect unknowing CEOs, who were not aware that
company practice or policies were resulting in adulterated food,
from criminal prosecution and destruction of their professional
careers. Rest assured a foodborne illness outbreak of the type
would still greatly impact the unknowing CEO. Just ask Mr.
Ells; suffering an 86 million dollar loss is a substantial
punishment.
CLAY D. SAPP

